this is discussed ad nauseam in aircraft accidents. Things happen fast in fast aircraft, the purpose of the instrument system is to relay all of the information necessary, as quickly and reliably as possible, in order of importance. In aircraft accidents the standard joke is "the aircraft was so far ahead of the pilot he couldn't even see the crash". This happens all to often to very experienced pilots, often because of distraction or fatigue.

I would lay the blame in this case on the navigator, as he allowed the boat to get ahead of the navigation by not understanding the limitations of his instruments. However there is also no doubt that had the instrument system been better designed, this grounding would not have happened. So while we can ask for better vigilance on the part of the navigator we should likewise ask for better design in the instruments. The fact that (as shown in the videos) the charting system could be, and often was expected to be, operated in a mode that did not show mortal hazards. The data was there, but hidden in a common operating mode. Paper, in this case, was a better design.

Instrument systems should always been designed with that in mind: unambiguous, rapid transfer of information in the order of importance. It is why a paper chart of the area shows rocks that proportionally do not occupy a single pixel, but who's importance justifies rendering them as hundreds of pixels anyway. It is why on aircraft charts each section has a large number printed which is the highest obstruction in the section. It is why in the early days of auto racing all of the gages would be turned so the needles where straight up with nominal readings, so that - at a glance - the information was conveyed. If extra button pushes, zooming around, flying the course, etc. are required, it is going to lead to grief in moments of distraction or by those who didn't get to Chapter 13 of the manual.

The 1st purpose of a navigation system is to keep from hitting land (or at least, hitting it only where you intend). It ought to be difficult, and require active participation of the operator to disable the display of warnings or information that accomplishes that. In this case it seems as though the reverse was true: either the correct zoom level had to be selected to even see the hazard, or an exclusion zone had to be explicitly drawn by the operator beforehand. While there is no such thing as a fool proof system (that would deny the existence of the greater fool), it is easy to say that electronic charting is still immature in this regard.

You would not design an aircraft glass cockpit such that at certain zoom levels some of the mountains disappeared, doing so would likely be considered criminal negligence. Why do it on boats? For data to be useful, it must be presented in a way that it can be used.